When it comes to the Middle East there is much conflict, and much dislike and superstition concerning neighbors. This is evident with the two subjects that this paper will deal with, Syria and Israel. After the 1967 war, a southern piece of territory belonging to Syria was taken, called the Golan Heights. Syria would now like that land back, but Israel is hesitant to do such a thing. This leads this paper to suggest that the reason why no peace agreement has occurred, is because of Israel and Syria's attitudes and policy towards the matter of the Golan Heights.
To illustrate this point, this paper will analyze the decisions made by both countries during the 1967 war. Then attitudes which have arisen after the conflict illustrate the animosity that causes positive peace negotiations to develop. Finally this paper will address how both sides have tried to reconcile their differences in an attempt to gain peace with one another.
The 1967 war lasted six days, and was fought between Israel and other Arab countries including Syria. At first there was hesitation on the side of Israel to attack Syria, because of its association with the Soviet Union. This was abandoned however mainly due to Israeli citizens on the border of Syria, wishing to advance into the fertile lands of the Golan heights, along with a plea from a northern Israeli command wishing to share in the glory that other Israeli soldiers had. “[A]t dawn on 9 June, a few hours after Syria's request for a ceasefire, Defense Minister Dayan ordered an immediate attack.”
This illustrates a moment where Israel should have used better judgment; instead of accepting a ceasefire with Syria, they chose to attack. This instance is the complete reason why a peace with Syria must now deal with the Golan Heights. If Israel had not taken this action, and not conquered the heights, an easier and more friendly peace agreement may have been adopted. However, it is difficult to condemn Israel entirely for wasting this opportunity. When the orders were given by Dayan, he had broken the chain of command, along with others in the military.
During the war Syria performed some impressive feats, such as destroying 160 Israeli tanks, while losing only 86. Because of the Israeli air force, Syria's infantry suffered major casualties, which forced Syria's commander at the front, Ahmad Al-Mir, to retreat. With this Israel had control of almost all the Golan Heights, and Syria had lost vital agricultural area, not to mention a place which could produce a good sum of dollars in tourism. But the loss of the heights for Syria was far more significant, including giving Israel control of fifteen and a half miles of terrain, and control of Lake Kinneret, also known as the Sea of Galilee, which now became one of Israel's top water sources. Also “[ t]he land is fertile, with the volcanic soil being used to cultivate vineyards and orchards and to raise cattle. The Golan is also home to Israel's only ski resort.”
These would all be stakes that Israel and Syria would have to deal with when discussing peace; such a valuable area would not be easy to give up for any country. A ceasefire was concluded the next day, which ended Israel's war with Syria. As seen earlier Israel initiated an attack on Syria which, if it had avoided, would not have placed the Golan Heights as a bargaining chip. Syria, although losing, gave a good fight using tanks, but the Israeli air force ruined any hope for Syria's infantry to keep control of the Golan Heights.
Once the Golan Heights were taken, “an armistice line was created and the region came under Israeli military control. Almost immediately Israel began to settle the area.” This second action of inhabitancy on the part of Israel will be discussed later in this paper. The war therefore is the exact reason the Golan Heights are the key issue for discussing peace. If the heights were never captured, a peace between Syria and Israel may have developed more easily.
Next this paper will explore the attitudes that these two countries share of one another. Israel never saw its borders of 1948 as its legitimate ones, as could be seen in an essay on the Peel Plan, which states, “[w]e have never accepted our unnatural border in the north.” This sentiment is strong when it comes to the occupied territories that Israel took from its neighbouring Arab countries. One former soldier had said, “Nu, Yigal, the whole land of Israel at last.” This attitude was natural: before the war few thought the conquered area had any security prospects, but now there was possibility.
