Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the execution of American foreign policy has been tremendously inconsistent with many of the nation’s publicly professed goals: defending universal human rights, freedom, and democracy, respecting sovereignty and international law, advocating international stability and fighting chaos; and opposing fascism, communism, and terrorism.
A compelling preponderance of evidence suggests that none of these factors - individual rights, national and international law, global stability, or ideology - has been a primary cause for American actions abroad, but that, instead, the pivotal factor in America's foreign policy decisions, rather, is predominantly economic. Where other explanations fail, this underlying motivation consistently explains American diplomatic initiatives, foreign aid, strategic military interventions, and commitments to war from 1898 until the present day. Furthermore, the impact of U.S. policies throughout the world has varied directly according to the principle of American economic-self interest. Nations and groups have often benefited when their goals align with this principle; overwhelmingly, they have suffered when these goals clash.
This essay explores the correlation between America's economic interests and its foreign policy, highlighting the ensuing inconsistencies with its other professed goals, by appealing to three case studies. First, America's policies in Cuba at the turn of the century expanded U.S. markets and defended U.S. business interests while disregarding principles of Cuban independence. Second, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations' policies in Europe during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath were morally and ideologically inconsistent, but successfully restored the stable political climate necessary for American business to flourish. America played a role in ending the Holocaust while firebombing Dresden, fought alongside communism against fascism, and helped to restore Western Europe's economy by both sending economic aid and ensuring many ex-Nazis' safety. Third, from the Truman administration through to the Nixon administration, America's policy towards Vietnam consistently placed economic interest above humanitarian concerns, favouring French colonialism over Vietnamese self-determination, election-rigging over genuine democracy, and massive bombing of civilian populations over diplomatic concessions. The common factor behind each case is the primacy of American economic concerns.
Howard Zinn argues that American foreign policy at the turn of the twentieth century was driven by an expansionist group of military figures and politicians seeking overseas markets for American goods.1 Irwin Unger agrees that Americans needed markets for their surplus, citing future Senator Albert Beveridge's 1898 declaration that “the trade of the world must and shall be ours. … Our institutions will follow our flag on the wings of our commerce.”2 Many of these policy-makers believed the use of military force to be an acceptable option for pursuing this goal. Theodore Roosevelt, a prominent and symbolic figure of this group, wrote privately in 1897 that he would “welcome almost any war, for I think this country needs one.”3 Economic imperialism, to be supported with force as necessary, was thus an undeniable feature of American foreign policy goals.
America's actions in Cuba at this time fit seamlessly into this mould. Indeed, American statements of economic interest in Cuba were widespread and public. In March of 1898, for example, a New York magazine proclaimed that America's interest in Cuba was driven by “humanity and love of freedom, and above all, the desire that the commerce and industry of every part of the world shall have full freedom of development.”4 The following month, sparked by an incident in which Spain was (likely speciously) accused of bombing the USS Maine, America entered into a military conflict on the side of Cuban rebels and quickly overthrew Spanish rule.5 After its victory over Spain, America's motivations - which, up to this point, seemed to have included a genuine desire to secure Cuban independence from foreign rule - became nakedly evident. No Cuban delegate was invited to confer on or to sign the Spanish surrender.6 President William McKinley refused to remove the U.S. military until the Cubans agreed to incorporate the Platt Amendment into their new constitution. This revision gave America the unrestricted right to “intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty,” and, in addition, guaranteed naval stations for exclusive American use.
7 Furthermore, key American figures displayed a clear disregard for public opinion and popular aspirations in Cuba. The head of the occupation forces, General Leonard Wood, for example, argued that “[t]he people of Cuba lend themselves readily to all sorts of demonstrations and parades, and little significance should be attached to them.”8 Zinn concludes that, though American policy “looked like an act of generosity,” it was designed with “power and profit in mind,” and included no plans for the genuine independence of the Cuban people.9 Unger, too, notes the economic benefits reaped for American business as a result of American actions in Cuba.10 Clearly, the U.S. government's concern for Cuba is better understood through the lens of economic self-interest than through American rhetoric about Cuban independence.
