The date, August 8, 1918, proved a most victorious day for the British forces in the World War. Although the victory did not serve to cut off the enemy's communications, or stop the opposing troops, it did disarm the German High Command.
The Kaiser was reported as saying: “I see that we must strike a balance. We are at the end of our resources. The war must be ended.”
Ludendorff demonstrated a similar despondency. His view was stated as follows: “The war would have to be ended.”
In order to understand this loss of German morale as of August 8, 1918, termed by Ludendorff, later, as “the black day of the German army,” it may be best to “reach back” in the archives and review the letter from Foch dated July 12, 1918 regarding his proposal to Haig as to “returning to the offensive.” The correspondence follows:
The first offensive to be launched on the British front should be one starting from the front Festubert-Rebecq, with a view to freeing the Bruay mines and forbidding the communication center of Estaires.
Five days later, Haig responded that he did not see the “advantage in advancing over the flat and marshy region located between Rebecq and Festubert,” and, thus, made the following suggestion (in his correspondence):
The operation in my opinion, which is of the highest importance and which I proposed to you as before, should be executed as soon as possible, is to push forward the Allied front to the east and southeast of Amiens so as to free that town and railway. The best way to carry out this object is to make a combined Franco-British operation, the French attacking south of Moreuil and the British north of the Luce.
To realize this project, I am preparing plans secretly for an offensive north of the Luce, direction east… In liaison with this project the French forces should, in my opinion, carry out an operation between Moreuil and Montdidier…
(As you can see), the letter brought forth from the archives provides insight on several areas of post-war controversy.
The first insight is that the origin of the offensive was conceptually British. Additionally, the focus was narrow; meaning the offensive “narrowly” entailed securing for Amiens and the railway a higher margin of safety.
Historically, it is debated whether the “true” idea originated with the Commander-in-Chief, Haig, or from Fourth Army Commander Rawlinson.
Before August 3, the “surprise operation” at Hamel on July 4th somewhat “crushed” the German morale; thus, inspiring Rawlinson to launch a wider offensive.
There is a second element regarding the plan of the offensive that “stands out” in the “archived” letter:
The correspondence counters the statement made by Haig's Command and from other sources, that the British were “pushed” by Foch, and against their own will, to allow the French to share in the operation-thereby increasing the hostile feelings of war.
The letter “clearly” shows that the (“aforementioned”) offensive was Haig's proposal. It is a fact that he suggested leaving a gap of a few miles between the attacks of the French and British; however, both were truly frontal and from a strategic standpoint, side by side.
A deeper offensive was possibly suggested in way of an attack on two flanks of the salient, north of Albert and to the far south of Montdidier, respectively.
However, a belt of trench-filled old Somme battlefields proved problematic and following events are unsupportive of the opinion that another army would have successfully “pulled off” such a surprise attack as the Fourth did south of the Somme.
The original project was increased due to Froch. On August 5th, he ordered that should the initial attack be successful, then it was to be continued by pushing towards Ham. If the offensives directed against the southern flank of the salient initiated by the Armies of Humbert and Mangin had proved successful, which were began on the 10th of August and 17th of August, respectively then maybe greater material gain might have been the yield. In reality, the close participation of Debeney's Army in cooperation with the British did little to make up for its hindrance to the plan of the “surprise” offensive. Since it lacked tanks, it could not carry out an initial bombardment; therefore, the British advance needed to be initiated beforehand in order not to lose the element of surprise.
Even so, how could greater material gain increase the moral effect the “Surprise” offensive had on the German's High Command? (The result was the shock of possibly the greatest surprise of the World War.) The surprise was subtle and comprised of many deceptive factors.
