After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent radical changes in the political and economic landscape of the country. However, one thing held over from the Soviet Era was the security apparatus, comprised of the military and intelligence agencies such as the Federal Security Service (hereafter referred to as the FSB). Anna Politkovskaya shows this in her collection of dispatches covering the Second Chechen War A Small Corner of Hell. As she writes when discussing the FSB and other security services, "...taken root in all government nooks and crannies of the country, just like in the Soviet era." (Politkovskaya, 119) Of course the security apparatus of Russia that is currently in place was also in existence during the First Chechen War under President Boris Yeltsin. These similarities at the time are well illustrated by both Anatol Lieven's Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power and A History of Russia by Catherine Evtuhov and Richard Stites. The methods used by the security services in both Chechen wars help to illustrate what Politkovskaya termed as "a striking neo-Soviet renaissance." (Politkovskaya, 154) As well as who profited from the wars and those who suffered from the brutal measures taken by both sides.
With the rise of Dzhokar Dudayev as President of Chechnya, Russia was faced with a prospect that it perceived to be in conflict with its national interests, as well as a threat to its national security. Dudayev was a proponent of Chechen Independence from Russia, and though Russia, and more specifically Yeltsin had allowed the union republics to fall away from the USSR, he feared allowing a precedent of succession to form after a possible succession of Chechnya (Stites, 495). So when Dudayev, summoning the images of Shamyl and the Chechen deportations during World War II, embarked on his separatist path, Yeltsin sent in the Russian military to quell the separatist movement. After several years of negotiation, tensioned reached a boiling point and escalated into a real war in 1994. With the beginning of the war, the Russian military and FSB began showing their ties to the Red Army and KGB of the Soviet era. At the time "Yleltsin turned to his inner circle of advisers and the "force' ministers- security, police, and army...' (Stites, 496). Like Stalin, who had used the Red Army when politically necessary, Yeltsin used the council of the force loyal to him the 1993 putsch. Yeltsin was especially influenced by his Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who felt quick victory in Chechnya would steal political thunder from the ultranationalist branches of Russian politics (Stites, 496).
Yeltsin's political moves were once again reminiscent of the Stalinist period, specifically the utilization of propaganda to garner support after the stunning military victory at Kronstadt. Military strategies that highlight the similarities between the Stalinist Period and the First Chechen war also are important to note. Anatol Lieven illustrates this in the book Chechnya: the Tombstone of Russian Power. While discussing the "Clausewitzian" battle strategies (seeking decisive large scale battles, and then pursuing the enemy until its destruction) initially adopted and then cast off by Russian forces in the First War in favor of more indirect methods, Lieven makes special mention of the use of indirect tactics against the citizenry of Chechnya. The Russian forces decided to focus their efforts against the Chechen population instead of directly against the rebels. The reasoning behind this was to drive the separatists out from hiding in the general populace by inflicting heavy tolls on the citizenry (Lieven, 127). This strategy is very reminiscent of the tactics used by Stalin against his own populace in order to discover actual saboteurs and traitors.
With the missile strike that killed Dudayev during peace talks, the overthrow of his government, and the seeming pacification of Chechen separatism, the First Chechen War ended. However, it would not be long until tensions between Russia and Chechnya flared once again. Before discussing the similarities between the Red Army/KGB and the Russian Military/FSB it is important to note the rise of Yeltsin's protégé and his similarities to the Communist Regime of old.
Vladimir Putin, an ex KGB agent as well as the civilian head of the FSB (Stites, 501) was Yeltsin's chosen successor and would inherit the Second Chechen War after Yeltsin left office. President Putin's history as a KGB and FSB man is a vitally important part of the Second Chechen War. As Politkovskaya says when speaking of betrayal "It fully corresponds with the type of politics that is being established in Russian Society in connection with the current president"s previous profession.' (Politkovskaya, 145). Even though the FSB was already handily slipping into all aspects of Russian politics, Putin's drastic ascension to power completed the cycle and cemented the FSB into a position as strong as the KGB had held in the Soviet Union. Though Putin's economic policy concerning state ownership of the means of the production were hardly Communist in nature, his iron fist policies towards Chechnya and his much lauded/protested tendencies towards authoritarianism fit perfectly into the nature of near-dictatorship that Stalin and his protégé's used to run their country.
