Why Animals Cannot Have Rights

Your article doesn't give any convincing reasons for believing that animals shouldn't be given rights. I won't bother with a detailed analysis of every issue that I have with your article. I will instead address the main theoretical points. I think your position can be stated quite simply: humans are the only beings that have rights because they are the only beings capable of using reason to control their selfish instincts, and they are therefore the only beings that can give rights to others.

I'll agree that we have no reason to believe that animals attribute rights to each other, but this is a poor justification for the claim that they don't deserve rights. The problem is that you've given no clear reason as to why a being can only be entitled to rights if they are able to afford them to others. A human baby cannot grasp the concept of rights in order to attribute them to another person. If this is the feature that is crucial in deciding whether a being has rights then it seems that you would have to argue that we shouldn't give babies any rights either.

Of course, this is absurd, and, accordingly, it becomes clear that your requirement that a being must have an understanding of the 'social contract' in order to have rights is also absurd. The key issue is that babies, along with almost all animals, have pain receptors. I'd argue that most species also have some kind of primative emotion. Take fear for example. Unless you want to argue that animals have no consciousness at all, it is clear from their behaviour that virtually all animals are capable of distress. As rational, emotional creatures it makes sense that human beings extend our care for other people to animals as well.

Your comparison with plants misses the point completely. Plants don't feel pain and cannot experience fear. Animals, however, can. You say that what sets us apart from animals is our ability to be rational and compassionate, rather than merely selfish. How, then, can you justify your claim that it is acceptable for humans to test on and comsume animals for the reason that it is "far more beneficial to humankind"? This is, I believe, an example of somebody putting their selfish instinct to further the survival of their species before their 'higher' motivation to be compassionate.

In summary, I think that you have failed to grasp one of the most important factors that should determine whether a being should be given rights: whether or not it would consciously suffer if we deny it these rights. That is to say, if an animal is aware of its suffering then it is wrong to knowingly cause pain to that creature.

The real issue here is whether or not that wrong should be treated as more or less significant than the wrong of failing to find treatments for serious medical conditions. Answer that and perhaps you will have given a sufficient justification for your position. Add to that a distinction between different cases, say between medical and cosmetic research, and you might really be getting somewhere.

In rebuttal to your points, Danielle:
A human baby’s rights are limited very strictly, contrary to your argument. They are protected from the legal system and are not considered accountable for their actions until they reach 10 years of age. Your argument therefore falls because we limit animal rights in the same way.

I would argue that animals are almost entirely devoid of consciousness except to the point they need in order to fulfil their instinctive needs. Animal pain is inferior to human pain due to the lack of long-term emotional damage caused by harm to animals. Let me offer this example – a woman loses her legs, she realises that she has lost much of her freedom and independence due to causes outside of her control, this causes great emotional stress. An animal does not even contemplate this, they merely lose their legs and get on with their life as best they can.

You state that it is selfish to test on and consume animals which is contrary to a rights system. I would agree with you, but seeing as animals do not have the capacity to reciprocate rights, we need not worry. If an animal in the way of a better quality of life for me , then I will destroy or test on that animal, because that is exactly what it would do to me. I need not worry about its suffering, as the pain, distress and fear you comment on are merely physical reactions to stimuli – hormones (adrenaline) released from the brain cause what you observe and would term ‘fear’. The human ‘emotion’ of fear is exactly the same, there is no difference.

Finally, let me answer your ‘real issue’. Let me put it in my terms, you want to weigh up the harm to animals and the harm to humankind of finding a cure to a disease. In my opinion you can kill as many rats as you like if it will eradicate cancer – if you disagree with me then I would find your morals highly questionable. In terms of cosmetic research, that can go ahead: the benefits are not as huge as with medical testing, but it increases human quality of life in some way, therefore it can be allowed. Animal cruelty on the other hand does not increase quality of life, which is why we punish it. It is also why we protect endangered species – it is in our human interest to protect endangered species as they offer interest to observers and allow scientists better understanding of the animal kingdom.

I hope I have answered the problems you had with my case.

I will Get right to the point by reposting this part of the article .

"A hippo however, will kill anything which gets between it and its watering hole - it's natural instinct to ensure its own survival (us humans don't go killing everyone in front of us in the queue at McDonald's though, and this is the crucial difference "

this is not true as a fact when you look at some humanbeings on a larger scale , countries invade other countries for the exploittation of thier resources , people have been killed by others due to greed from someone they knew or trusted , I was almost murderd and then again almost killed by someone trying to get what they wanted from me and a person that assoiciated with this person , because they needed to hide the truth that they had and were involved in the matter . so called human beings with the ability to overide thier baser instincts , animals are basically automatons instinct preprogrammed machines , that will always operate at that level no matter what , but they should have rights and must have rights because it is thier truest nature it is what they are , no more no less , but the humans I desribed were less than animals and chose to harm me out of thier own base desires of greed nad hatred not thier instincts for survival..

"A right, properly understood, is a claim, or potential claim,
that one party may exercise against another. The target against
whom such a claim may be registered can be a single person, a
group, a community, or (perhaps) all humankind. The content of
rights claims also varies greatly: repayment of loans,
nondiscrimination by employers, noninterference by the state, and
so on. To comprehend any genuine right fully, therefore, we must
know who holds the right, against whom it is held, and to what it
is a right.

Alternative sources of rights add complexity. Some rights are
grounded in constitution and law (e.g., the right of an accused
to trial by jury); some rights are moral but give no legal claims
(e.g., my right to your keeping the promise you gave me); and
some rights (e.g., against theft or assault) are rooted both in
morals and in law.

The differing targets, contents, and sources of rights, and their
inevitable conflict, together weave a tangled web. Notwithstanding all
such complications, this much is clear about rights in general: they
are in every case claims, or potential claims, within a community of
moral agents. Rights arise, and can be intelligibly defended, only
among beings who actually do, or can, make moral claims against one
another. Whatever else rights may be, therefore, they are necessarily
human; their possessors are persons, human beings. [p.865]

The attributes of human beings from which this moral capability
arises have been described variously by philosophers, both
ancient and modern: the inner consciousness of a free will (Saint
Augustine); the grasp, by human reason, of the binding character
of moral law (Saint Thomas); the self-conscious participation of
human beings in an objective ethical order (Hegel); human
membership in an organic moral community (Bradley); the
development of the human self through the consciousness of other
moral selves (Mead); and the underivative, intuitive cognition of
the rightness of an action (Prichard). Most influential has been
Immanuel Kant's emphasis on the universal human possession of a
uniquely moral will and the autonomy its use entails. Humans
confront choices that are purely moral; humans -- but certainly
not dogs or mice -- lay down moral laws, for others and for
themselves. Human beings are self-legislative, morally
auto-nomous [sic]. [p.865-866]

Animals (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense of that
word) lack this capacity for free moral judgment. They are not
beings of a kind capable of exercising or responding to moral
claims. Animals therefore have no rights, and they can have
none. This is the core of the argument about the alleged rights
of animals. The holders of rights must have the capacity to
comprehend rules of duty, governing all including themselves. In
applying such rules, the holders of rights must recognize
possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what
is just. Only in a community of beings capable of
self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be
correctly invoked.

Humans have such moral capabilities. They are in this sense
self-legislative, are members of communities governed by moral
rules, and do possess rights. Animals do not have such moral
capacities. They are not morally self-legislative, cannot
possibly be members of a truly moral community, and therefore
cannot possess rights. In conducting research on animal subjects,
therefore, we do not violate their rights, because they have none
to violate.

To animate life, even in its simplest forms, we give a certain
natural reverence. But the possession of rights presupposes a
moral status not attained by the vast majority of living
things. We must not infer, therefore, that a live being has,
simply in being alive, a "right" to its life. The assertion that
all animals, only because they are alive and have interests, also
possess the "right to life" is an abuse of that phrase, and
wholly without warrant.

It does not follow from this, however, that we are morally free
to do anything we please to animals. Certainly not. In our
dealings with animals, as in our dealings with other human
beings, we have obligations that do not arise from claims against
us based on rights. Rights entail obligations, but many of the
things one ought to do are in no way tied to another's
entitlement. Rights and obligations are not reciprocals of one
another, and it is a serious mistake to suppose that they are.

.... Plainly, the grounds of our obligations to humans and to
animals are manifold and cannot be formulated simply. Some hold
that there is a general obligation to do no gratuitous harm to
sentient creatures (the principle of nonmaleficence); some hold
that there is a general obligation to do good to sentient
creatures when that is reasonably within one's power (the
principle of beneficence). In our dealings with animals, few will
deny that we are at least obliged to act humanely -- that is, to
treat them with the decency and concern that we owe, as sensitive
human beings, to other sentient creatures. To treat animals
humanely, however, is not to treat them as humans or as the
holders of rights.

A common objection, which deserves a response, may be paraphrased
as follows:

"If having rights requires being able to make moral claims, to
grasp and apply moral laws, then many humans -- the
brain-damaged, the comatose, the senile -- who plainly lack those
capacities must be without rights. But that is absurd. This
proves [the critic concludes] that rights do not depend on the
presence of moral capacities."

This objection fails; it mistakenly treats an essential feature of
humanity as though it were a screen for sorting humans. The capacity
for moral judgment that distinguishes humans from animals is not a
test to be administered to human beings one by one. Persons who are
unable, because of some disability, to perform the full moral
functions natural to human beings are certainly not for that reason
ejected from the moral community. The issue is one of kind. Humans
are of such a kind that they may be the subject of experiments only
with their voluntary consent. The choices they make freely must be
respected. Animals are of such a kind that it is impossible for them,
in principle, to give or withhold voluntary consent or to make a moral
choice. What humans retain when disabled, animals have never
had. [p.866]

A second objection, also often made, may be paraphrased as
follows:

"Capacities will not succeed in distinguishing humans from the
other animals. Animals also reason; animals also communicate with
one another; animals also care passionately for their young;
animals also exhibit desires and preferences. Features of moral
relevance - rationality, interdependence, and love -- are not
exhibited uniquely by human beings. Therefore [this critic
concludes], there can be no solid moral distinction between
humans and other animals."

This criticism misses the central point. lt is not the ability to
communicate or to reason, or dependence on one another, or care
for the young, or the exhibition of preference, or any such
behavior that marks the critical divide. Analogies between human
families and those of monkeys, or between human communities and
those of wolves, and the like, are entirely beside the
point. Patterns of conduct are not at issue. Animals do indeed
exhibit remarkable behavior at times. Conditioning, fear,
instinct, and intelligence all contribute to species
survival. Membership in a community of moral agents nevertheless
remains impossible for them. Actors subject to moral judgment
must be capable of grasping the generality of an ethical premise
in a practical syllogism. Humans act immorally often enough, but
only they -- never wolves or monkeys -- can discern, by applying
some moral rule to the facts of a case, that a given act ought or
ought not to be performed. The moral restraints imposed by humans
on themselves are thus highly abstract and are often in conflict
with the self-interest of the agent. Communal behavior among
animals, even when most intelligent and most endearing, does not
approach autonomous morality in this fundamental sense. [p.866-867]

Genuinely moral acts have an internal as well as an external
dimension. Thus, in law, an act can be criminal only when the
guilty deed, the actus reus, is done with a guilty mind, mens
rea. No animal can ever commit a crime; bringing animals to
criminal trial is the mark of primitive ignorance. The claims of
moral right are similarly inapplicable to them. Does a lion have
a right to eat a baby zebra? Does a baby zebra have a right not
to be eaten? Such questions, mistakenly invoking the concept of
right where it does not belong, do not make good sense. Those who
condemn biomedical research because it violates "animal rights"
commit the same blunder." [p. 867]

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Carl Cohen. "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical
Research" The New England Journal of Medicine 315, no. 14
(October 2,1986): 865-69.