Proving the existence of an idea is different from the understanding of that idea. Dreams are a good example of such concepts that are proven as existing but never understood. In other words, although we are able to distinguish dreams from reality, the understanding of the origin and cause of such experiences remain in gray area. The concept of freedom poses the same set of problems; we feel the existence of free will but we are unable to capture its essence. Kant, in the third antinomy, argues that just because something is not fully understood does not mean that it does not exist.
According to the “Thesis” of the third Antinomy, Freedom is a type of causality that is separate from the causality in accordance with the rules of nature. The “antithesis” disagrees by claiming that there is no freedom because it is not possible for unity of experience to remain intact in the presence of such independent way of acting. Kant offers a resolution that does not refuse either one of the claims. Instead, he succeeds in excavating a middle pathway that provides space for the possibility of Freedom in a unique manner.
In detail, the “Thesis” claims to have found a type of causality that is the product of freedom or freewill. To strengthen its case, the “thesis” claims that causality in accordance with the laws of nature is self-contradictory because it fails to suffice its own criterion that requires that “nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined a priori.” Causality in the laws of nature, according to the thesis argument, is not determined a priori; it is the result of a presupposed “preceding state and its causality” since all stages of this causal chain are set in accordance with the rigid laws of nature. Thus, it claims that it is necessary to have another type of causality that is spontaneous but not relative.
Kant perceives the idea of freedom (or an ability to perform an act independent of the causality that is in agreement with the laws of nature) as a fresh beginning of a series of appearances that are triggered by an action that is not a preceding part or a continuation of causal chain. In other words, this action happens in independence of the natural causes. This approach, however, does not jeopardize the unity of experience that requires that all actions be connected with each other. The reason Kant provides is that the change in causality is not a change in time since for time it is simply a “continuation of a preceding series.” Freedom, therefore, is possible but not as the “thesis” has claimed it to be. According to Kant, freedom can be proved and has been proved by many philosophers when they “felt themselves obliged, when explaining cosmical movements, to assume a prime mover, that is, freely acting cause, which first and of itself began this series of states.” (P 415 smith)
Since freedom is proven but not understood, chances of disagreement regarding the existence of freedom are inevitable:
But every beginning of action presupposes
a state of the not yet acting cause; and a
Dynamical beginning of the action, if it
is also a first beginning, presupposes a
state which has no causal connection
with the preceding state of the cause, that
is to say, in nowise follows from it.
Transcendental freedom thus stands opposed
To the law of causality; and the kind of
connection which it assumes as holding
Between the successive states of the active
Causes renders all unity of experience impossible
This above quoted passage is the core of the argument the antithesis presents against freedom. The notion of experience requires that all appearances occur with a cause and effect connection. Hence, freedom is impossible because it destroys that needed element by introducing new sequences to the causal chain. The “antithesis” therefore claims that there is absolutely no freedom and everything takes place in accordance with the laws of nature. It says that for the unity of experience to stay intact, there can only be one kind of causality; the causality that is in accordance with the laws of nature. In the absence of such causality, and in the presence of transcendental freedom, cause will have new beginning for every state and, thus, will remain unconnected with the causality of actions necessary for the formation of experience. For the “antithesis” coherence in events is a necessary element that cannot be established with the presence of transcendental freedom.
Kant disagrees with the necessity “antithesis” imposes upon causality and nature:
since the substances in the world have always
existed-at least the unity of experience renders
necessary such a supposition-there is no
difficulty in assuming that change of their states,
that is a series of their alteration, has likewise
always existed, and therefore that a first beginning
whether mathematical or dynamical, is not to be
looked for.
Kant begins by rejecting all limitations upon the possibility of freedom acting as an agent for the alteration of the appearances. Kant criticizes the “Antithesis” by suggesting that, for its own convenience, Antithesis imposes limitation on nature that is limitless. The idea of strict causation and rigidness in nature threatens the understanding about many “fundamental synthetic properties and forces.” Moreover, he claims that transcendental freedom is at least necessary for the alteration of sequences of experience. In other words, no change in appearances can occur without the idea of freedom. It is in that sense that Kant believes Freedom to be present and nature to be lacking a rigid or unchangeable state. Nevertheless, Kant refers to freedom as an “enigma” because although he is able to prove the existence of such force, the understanding of it is still limited.
