The Bush Doctrine

Many of the 25 signatories were appointed to key positions including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, National Security Council appointees Zalmay Khalilzad and Elliott Abrams, Richard Perle as chair of the Defense Policy Board, Frank Gaffney as the head of the Center for Security Policy, Fred Iklé at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Vin Weber as board chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy. (Gurtov, p. 29) These influential characters have set the tone on many issues including firm support of Israel, ballistic missile defense, Taiwan independence, high military spending, and regime change. Many claim President Bush to be his own man when it comes to foreign policy, a "realist hegemonist" they call him, but with important advisors in both the Neo-Conservative camp, Cheney and Rumsfeld, and the Realists camp, Rice, the difference in the actual outcome is slim.

The core principles of the Bush Doctrine revolve around three distinct policies: Unilateralism, Regime Change, and Preemption. The former two of these three areas have long been standards of American Foreign Policy, though covertly. However, before 2000 American Presidents had always looked on their global goals and ambitions through the lenses of "exceptionalism" and the "American Dream." They believed that "the principles and ideals upon which [the United States] was founded were unquestionably superior...to the ideas that had shaped nations and governments throughout human history." (Kagan, p.88) These grandiose phrases and powerful inspiration swayed many in the west to their call. However, the Bush Administration decided that it was no longer enough. Since America was the sole Superpower, they should start acting like it. "The Bush Doctrine rejected deterrence and containment...preemptive attack now was deterrence." (Gurtov, p. 39) Some might even call it preventive war, the difference being that preemption is defensive undertaken when there is a "reasonable expectation of being attacked almost immediately," where as "preventive war is waged offensively to destroy an enemy's war-making assets and...render it unable to become strong enough to attack." (Gurtov, p. 40-41). Whether or not one believes that the United States was acting defensively or offensively in its actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the idea of preemptively attacking a sovereign state is unprecedented.

It implies that the sovereignty of any state is subject to America's discretion. It is a hallmark of realist thinking and unsurprising in light of the Bush Doctrine's world view and a predictable result of the tragedy that happened on September 11th. In combination with undisclosed unilateral action and regime change the Bush Doctrine appears Neo-imperial in manner. The "Lessons of Munich" still very much apply in American strategic thought and George Kennan's "Logic of Force" has been readopted and reapplied on the world stage. (Kagan, p. 91)

"America did not change on September 11th. It only became more itself." (Kagan, p. 85) Some would call the terrorist attack the turning point in the Post-Cold War Era. Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" was at an end. The triumph of western ideas and liberal democracy was brought into question. The implementation of the Bush Doctrine and the Bush Administration's Hegemonic were immediately applied and unilateral action was planned against Afghanistan. The monumental invoking of section 5 of the NATO charter however, turned this unilateral action into a multilateral force from the entire western world. Instead of seeing this as an advantage the Bush Administration looked upon this suspicion. They believed that the NATO nations wished to exercise control over the power of the United States instead of genuinely sympathizing with the tragedy that befell this country. Due to this reaction the Bush Administration lost a valuable opportunity to gain international legitimacy and prestige. Disagreements with North Korea and Iran over their nuclear programs and a strong resolve not to negotiate with "Axis of Evil" states led to a breakdown in talks with both states and a successful nuclear program in North Korea. The Bush Administration also took an aggressive stance toward Iraq, demanding sanctions at every turn. The Bush Administration clearly stated, once they had decided that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, that if the U.N. Security council would not go to war against Iraq then they would take a "Coalition of the Willing" and oust the dictatorship themselves, which they subsequently did. This blatantly public unilateral action resulting in the change of regimes is a perfect example of the Neo-Conservative idea of American power and strength.

Personally I believe that the so called "Bush Doctrine" at its core is a valid approach to world politics. It is the implementation of the policy that has been a failure. At the core of this doctrine have been the basic principles of realist thinking. While a society like the one described in Fukuyama's "End of History" would be a paradise compared to the violence and destruction wrought in the 20th century, the world has shown increasing tendencies to rebel against the ideas of liberal democracy and the western world. China and Russia show little tendency toward shifting to a more free and open society. Conflict runs rampant across the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. The United States has consistently guarded the gates and walls of the free world. The "Kantian Paradise" that is Europe "cannot long survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous Hobbesian world that still flourishes outside Europe." (Kagan, p. 75) The United States played a crucial role in the formation of this paradise in Europe and now, as the sole superpower, America has to continue to defend the integrity of the Kantian world by interacting on the terms of the Hobbesian one. "Europe's...new Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power" and it can only continue to exist with the stalwart American defense manning the walls and the gates of the violent world. (Kagan, p. 73) American has learned to play by that double standard. It is time the rest of the world learned that as well.
The ripples that the Bush Administration has created have reached far and wide. Many say that "being disliked comes with the territory, with being history's actors." (Gurtov, p. 230) This is not always the case, and in the future administrations are going to have to learn how to balance that double standard, and both learn to cooperate and defend the liberal democratic world. The alternative does not look very bright for the future of the United States, but nor does it shine on the rest of the world either.