In itself, an individual representational system seems that it could provide us with an understanding of stereotyping and stereotyping formation without some form of aid from a collective/cultural point of view. However, just following through in Piaget's thinking will already provide some questions and problems that a strict individual approach could not possibly meet to resolve. Indeed, Piaget mentions this obstacle as one that needs further clarification (Piaget, 1971). Although the structures of our minds in their adaptability and development (Travis, 1939; Hayes-Roth, 1977) can explain to us why we could easily form stereotypic knowledge, a pure individual approach incompletely explains why an individual do not always utilize this stereotypic knowledge (Brewer, 1996). The stereotypic knowledge is within but to use or not to use this knowledge can strongly depend on the specific individual's orientations. Accordingly, a strict individualistic approach partly overlooks the strong amount of research that explains the powerful influence that a collective group has over an individual's beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001; Allport, 1935; Asch, 1952). In addition, this approach also fails to mention that most individuals differ in their growth in learning. For example, since learning begins with the development and strengthening of representations of lower order components, the way we recursively organize these components into a higher order would strongly depend on the individual's linkages of associations as further learning proceeds (Hayes-Roth, 1977).
Generalizations of Collective Representations
Whereas the individual approach focuses on the microcosmic stereotype representation, collective and cultural approaches orient toward how society is the paramount and keeper of all stored knowledge. Our knowledge of customs, mores and traditions are, in part, inherent as a major component of the “fabric of society” (Farr & Moscovici, 1984). The relationship between culturally specific practices and the individual can be understood also in the work of Lev Vygotsky, a prominent Russian psychologist whose work on social interaction can elucidate us on important aspects of the collective representation approach.
Vygotsky encourages us to focus on how culture-the values, beliefs, customs, and skills of a social group-is transmitted to the next generation (Vygotsky, 1987). Social interaction comes into play when we talk about culture. In reference to categorization, we need to take into account that cooperative communication between people and more knowledgeable members of society will consequently bring about to more knowledge and skills for that individual to be successful in that specific society, culture or collective group (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986, 1987). We also know the relevance of communication as a primary means by which people attempt to influence and convert each other (Kraus & Fussell, 1991, 1996; Ruscher, 1998).
Yet, given this information, the model of collective representations alone comes almost to an abrupt halt in explaining stereotyping processes. Stangor and Schaller (1996) have observed that there is a lack of evidence within collective approaches in consideration in the area of culturally determined stereotypes. This conclusion stems from the fact that there is little hard evidence and most of the evidence that have been employed rely mostly on individual-level measures of perceptual distortion and bias (Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Clearly the need for a better model is imminent.
Why An Integrationist Feedback Model?
A feedback approach is not a new approach. Relevant findings by Carver, Scheier and others have placed emphasis on its importance in determining, expounding and explaining individual behaviour (see Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1998; MacKay, 1963, 1966; Miller et. al., 1960; Powers, 1973; Scheier & Carver, 1988; Wiener, 1948). Despite the feedback model's relevance in addressing the individual, more research and clarification are needed in its approach towards the collective. Carver and Scheier were both well aware of this limitation (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1998; Scheier & Carver, 1988). This proposed model then operates under the strength of an individual approach rather than a collective. This proposed feedback model assumes that the similarities, parallels, and analogous attributes of both the individual and collective representations are the consequent results of a natural law that preexists inherently in these two domains.
Nonetheless, there are also evidential findings which support the coherence of a dynamic relationship between individual and collective mechanisms. Nowak, Szamrej and Latane have observed that “an interactive relation between that of individuals and their social contexts can result in the emergence of new regularities at the levels of both the individual and the collective” (Nowak, Szamrej, &Latane, 1990). Doise (1986), Kenny (1987) and Nowak (1976) believed that social phenomena exists in differing levels of social reality. The relationship between the individual and the collective approach can be formulated and tested independently at each of these levels, whether they represent the cognitions, feelings and behaviour of individuals or they represent large-scale human aggregates and systems (Nowak, Szamrej & Latane, 1990; Doise, 1986; Kenny, 1987; Nowak, 1976). Furthermore, these "natural laws" are more than just abstract concepts. Lower levels of social reality within individuals may have unforeseen, seemingly emergent, consequences for higher levels, which, in turn, will affect the social environment facing lower level units (Nowak, Szamrej, & Latane, 1990).
