The proposed integrationist-feedback model is not the result of an independent insight in the realms of stereotype representation. The proposed model is built on other theoretical foundations written by researchers such as Stangor (1996), Schaller (1996), Tajfel (1969), Carver & Scheier (1981, 1998). Previous studies by Stangor and Schaller have both proposed a unified theory of categorization using the idea of fundamental human needs: the need for explaining and predicting the social world as well as esteem maintenance (Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Stangor and Schaller (1996) mentioned that the subsequent form or model that the synthesis will take diminutively matters. What is important is that any proposed form may yield greater insights than a single line of inquiry as in the case of a dichotomous model (Stangor & Schaller, 1996).
A unified theory of categorization seems to elude many researchers because of the inherent and intertwined values that are subsumed within the individual and collective psychology. The distinction between the two has given us key insights and indeed is a complimentary perspective as observed by Stangor and Schaller (Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Similarly, Tajfel and Forgas (1981) also recognized that key distinctions between individual and collective representations provide essential foundational basis for further knowledge (Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Forgas, 1981). The idea that individual and collective representations exist in a linear relationship is a gross misrepresentation and oversimplification of Tajfel's findings. Tajfel did emphasize the sheer difficulty of integration but this does not imply impossibility (Tajfel, 1981). Hypothetically speaking, this linear relationship only emphasizes that the collective, top-down processing must be taken into consideration before the individual bottom-up processing. In this area, I would like to interject that this linear relationship model not only is insufficient for us to understand how stereotype and stereotype categorizations would actually function but could possibly hinder a real road to an integrative perspective.
Runyan has proposed several standards in determining the coherence of proposed theoretical models (Runyan, 1982). Hence, an integrationist feedback model of categorizations must be assessed accordingly to analytical standards (Runyan, 1982). Is the proposed model logically sound? Is it comprehensive in accounting for a number of puzzling aspects of events in question? Can the integrationist feedback model be falsified such as tests in derived predictions or retrodictions? Is an integrationist feedback approach consistent with a full range of available relevant evidential findings? Does the model obtain its support from previous theoretical studies and is the model consistent with general foundational knowledge about human functioning? Can the proposed model sustain theoretical credibility relative to other explanatory hypotheses? (Runyan, 1982, pg. 47)
The real issue that we have to come to terms with are the complexities that both individual and collective categorization represent. When we usually deal with relatively small groups and fairly simple mechanisms of individual behaviour, these interactions may seem relatively clear (Nowak, Szamrej & Latane, 1990). A much closer examination however presents us that as group size increases and laws about individual responses become more and more complex, we arrive at factual limitations. Simply put, mental formulas and paper-and-pencil calculations must be supplemented by other media as proposed by Harris and Ostrom (Harris, 1976; Ostrom, 1988b). Accurate assessment and measurement between the two mechanisms is a must.
Consequently, more work is needed, for both theoretical and practical reasons. There is still a need to test more laboratory findings in field settings and to utilize such findings to revise this theoretical model. How does language become an emergent factor in bridging conceptual gaps between individual and collective categorizations? Why are trust and social validation relevant factors in a multiagent connectionist model? What are the relevance of goals in both individual and collective approaches in light of a feedback system? What are the underlying processes in which goals become the reference value for behaviour or cognitive alterations? How do group goals influence individual goals and vice versa? What are the implications? Scrutinizing key components of this theoretical model must be its primary approach. Essentially, to recognize an integrationist influence is to also recognize a developing heuristic tool in interpreting and evaluating an individual approach as well as a collective approach.
One should also note that key findings in field settings need to be incorporated systematically into laboratory experiments. A major weakness of computer simulation and modeling is that it needs to be supplemented and further balanced with field experiments. Most importantly, this article does not offer any easy answers at integration. To offer oversimplified generalizations of two such powerful approaches in the understanding of stereotyping and stereotyping production would be careless and misleading. We do know that integration is a possibility and from this, we can move forward to confronting the need to balance these competing pressures. Thus, given all the attention that an individual and collective categorization has drawn, this issue emerges as critically important within human experience. As Allport (1954) and Tajfel (1969) have noted, "so central is the categorizational process to the operation of prejudice that some have argued that it is the sine qua non without which prejudice could not exist".
